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WINTER V. NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL:
ENABLING THE MILITARY'S ONGOING ROLLBACK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")'
in an effort to encourage environmental responsibility in federal agency
decision-making. 2 Recently, NEPA and other environmental laws have
been challenged by the military, which has asserted that these laws interfere with combat readiness and, therefore, national security.3 In Winter v.
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,4 the Court invalidated portions of a preliminary injunction restricting the Navy's use of highintensity sonar, finding that the balance of equities and public policy
interests favored the Navy's interest in conducting realistic training exercises. 5 The Court's evaluation of the balance of equities and public policy interests, however, was based on its complete deference to the Navy's
6
factual determinations regarding crucial aspects of the case.
This Comment argues that the Court's complete deference to the
Navy's factual determinations unfairly tipped the balance of equities and
public policy interests in favor of the Navy. This made it impossible for
the Court to accurately evaluate the propriety of injunctive relief. While a
measure of deference to the military's professional expertise is desirable,
excessive deference undermines other key government objectives. By so
deferring to the Navy's factual determinations, the Court enabled the
military's ongoing rollback of environmental protection.
Part I of this Comment explains NEPA's environmental impact
statement ("EIS") requirement, then discusses the standards that courts
have used when evaluating the propriety of injunctive relief. Part 1H
summarizes the Court's opinion in Winter, including the facts, procedurI.
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
2. Id. § 4331(a):
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of
all components of the natural environment ... declares that it is the continuing policy of
the Federal Government... to use all practicable means and measures ... to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans.
3. Marcilynn A. Burke, Green Peace? Protecting Our National Treasures While Providing
for Our National Security, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 803 passim (2008).
4.
129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
5. Id. at 378.
6. See id.
See Burke, supra note 3, at 874 ("[Wlhile [the Department of Defense] asserts its need for
7.
this statutory relief to fulfill its obligation to defend this nation, it may be simultaneously abandoning
much of what makes this country worth defending.").
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al history, and opinions. Part 1I explores three topics: (1) the Court's
deference to the Navy's factual determinations; (2) the impact that Winter may have on future military compliance with NEPA; and (3) the Winter decision in the context of post-9/11 trends in military environmental
compliance. This Comment concludes that the Winter Court unreasonably deferred to the Navy, that Winter threatens to undermine NEPA, and
that Winter highlights the military's ongoing rollback of environmental
legislation in the wake of 9/11.
I. BACKGROUND

A. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
NEPA requires that every federal agency consider the environmental consequences of a proposed course of action before acting. 8 To this
end, NEPA requires that an agency submit a detailed EIS prior to undertaking any activity that "significantly affect[s] the quality of the human
environment." 9 When the action would result in no significant impact on
the environment, NEPA permits agencies to file an environmental assessment ("EA") in lieu of an EIS, or to rely on a categorical exclusion if
one applies.' °
Crucially, NEPA does not require a particular substantive result in
any case. Nonetheless, in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,"2
the Court noted that NEPA does contain "action-forcing" procedures.'
First, a timely EIS focuses an agency's attention on the environmental
consequences of a proposed project, ensuring that the agency is aware of
those consequences before starting the project.' 3 Second, a timely EIS
assures the public that the agency has taken environmental consequences
into account during the decision-making process. 14 NEPA's implementing regulations also require that the agency accept public input once a
draft EIS is released.' 5 Third, a timely EIS gives notice to the various
other governmental bodies that might have to deal with the project's offsite or secondary consequences. 6

8. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)-(b) (2006).
9. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
10. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2009) (explaining the Council on Environmental Quality's definition of "Environmental Assessment"); id. § 1508.13 (explaining the Council on Environmental
Quality's definition of "[finding of no significant impact"); id. § 1501.4(2) (explaining that categorically excluded activities do not normally require an EIS).
11. 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
12.
Id. at 348-51.
13.
Id. at 349.
14.

Id.

15.
16.

40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4) (2009).
Id. § 1503.1(a)(1).

WINTER V. NRDC

2009]

B. The Test for Evaluating the Proprietyof Injunctive Relief
Preliminary injunctions are remedies at equity, issued only where
there is a risk of irremediable injury, and where legal remedies would be
inadequate.' 7 Courts have traditionally evaluated the propriety of injunctive relief by balancing the inconvenience to the non-moving party
(should the injunction be imposed) against the risk of irreparable harm to
the moving party.' 8 Courts also give attention to the public consequences
of ordering injunctive relief. 19 Until Winter, the Ninth Circuit applied a
more flexible standard, and Ninth Circuit courts were able to tailor injunctive relief to fit "the necessities of the particular case."2 ° Some have
argued that this flexible standard unduly increases the availability of injunctive relief, which has traditionally only been imposed in extraordinary circumstances. 21
U. WINTER V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
A. Facts
For the last forty years, the Navy has used mid-frequency active
("MFA") sonar during training exercises off of the southern coast of California ("SOCAL").2 2 The MFA sonar system works by emitting highintensity sound into the ocean depths, and then analyzing the echoes to
reveal underwater objects.2 3 MFA sonar is currently the only available
means of detecting the near-silent submarines deployed by potential military adversaries.24
However, a "rapidly accumulating body of evidence" shows that
MFA sonar injures marine mammals, both directly and indirectly. 25 The
26
SOCAL waters are home to thirty-seven species of marine mammals.
Directly, MFA sonar generates energy sufficient to cause cranial hemorrhaging or decompression sickness in these animals. 27 Indirectly,
MFA sonar harms marine mammals by contributing to underwater noise
pollution. 28 Because many marine mammals have evolved to depend on
sound, any significant increase in underwater noise pollution, such as the

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982).
ld. at 312.
Id.
Id.
See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375-76 (2008).
Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Winter, 129 S.Ct. 365 (No. 07-1239), 2008 WL 3285392.
Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 370.
Id. at 370-71.

See Joel R. Reynolds, Submarines, Sonar, and the Death of Whales: Enforcing the Deli25.
cate Balance of Environmental Compliance and National Security in Military Training, 32 WM.&
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 759,760 (2008).

26.
27.
28.

Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 371.
Reynolds, supra note 25, at 762-63.
Id. at 760.
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use of MFA sonar, impairs marine mammals' breeding, hunting and navigation activities. 29
B. ProceduralHistory
In February 2007, the Navy released an EA for an upcoming series
of SOCAL training exercises, 30 estimating that the exercises would result
in over 500 severe and 170,000 minor injuries to marine mammals in
SOCAL waters. 3 1 Nevertheless, the Navy concluded that this did not
amount to the requisite "significant impact" on the environment, and
therefore that a full EIS would not be necessary. 32
Plaintiff National Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") filed a
complaint against the Navy shortly thereafter, alleging that the Navy
violated NEPA by proceeding with the exercises without first preparing
an EIS.33 NRDC sought to compel the Navy to prepare an EIS.34 The
district court found the Navy's EA inadequate, and that the EA did not
relieve the Navy of its obligation to prepare a full EIS.35 Accordingly, the
district court enjoined the Navy's use of MFA sonar until the Navy prepared an EIS.36 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court's
injunction was too broad, and remanded the case with instructions to
impose mitigation provisions that would allow the Navy to continue its
exercises.37
On remand, the district court imposed on the Navy a synthesis of six
mitigation provisions. 38 The Navy challenged two of the six provisions
on appeal: the mandatory shutdown of MFA sonar when a marine mammal is sighted within 2200 yards, and the mandatory seventy-five percent
reduction in sonar volume during "surface ducting" 39 conditions. 40 While
waiting for the appeal, the Navy sought emergency 4 1 Executive Branch
relief from the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ"),42 which au29.
Id.
30.
Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 372.
31.
Id. at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
32.
Id. at 372 (majority opinion).
33.
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113-14 (C.D. Cal.
2008).
34.
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 518 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 2008).
35.
Winter, 530 F. Supp. at 1116-17.
36.
Id.
at 1115.
37.
Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 373.
38.
Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d. at 1118-21.
39. Surface ducting conditions "occur[] when the presence of layers of water of different
temperature make it unusually difficult for sonar operators to determine whether a diesel submarine
is hiding below." Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 385 (Breyer, J., concurring).
40.
Id. at 373 (majority opinion). Hereinafter these two provisions will be referred to as
"shutdown" and "power-down" provisions.
41.
Under NEPA's implementing regulations, agencies may, in emergency circumstances,
request the Executive Branch to authorize alternative arrangements that are limited to the scope of
the emergency. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2009).
42. The Council on Environmental Quality is the Executive Branch office that is responsible
for overseeing federal compliance with NEPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (2006).
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thorized the Navy to implement alternative arrangements of its own making.4 3

Alternative arrangements in hand, the Navy asked the Ninth Circuit
to vacate the shutdown and power-down provisions.44 The Ninth Circuit
disregarded the alternative arrangements, finding that emergency circumstances did not exist, and the court upheld the two challenged provisions in the district court's injunction. 45 The Navy petitioned for certiorari on the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing the preliminary injunction, and the Supreme Court granted the petition.46

C. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court, with Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joining. 47 The majority opinion discussed the propriety of the shutdown and power-down provisions in the
district court's preliminary injunction.4 8 As such, it generally avoided
addressing whether NEPA required the Navy to prepare an EIS before
starting the sonar exercises. 49 The Court found that the shutdown and
power-down provisions in the district court's injunction were an abuse of
discretion, because the district court failed to accord sufficient deference
to the Navy's factual determinations when evaluating the balance of equities and public policy interests.50
First, the Court adjusted the standard the Ninth Circuit used when
deciding whether a preliminary injunction would be proper. The Ninth
Circuit standard, prior to Winter, allowed the court to order an injunction
when there was a "possibility" of irreparable harm to the moving party. 5'
The Court found this standard to be too lenient, and established that there
must instead be a "likelihood" of irreparable harm to the moving party. 52
In light of the confusion surrounding this issue, Chief Justice Roberts synthesized precedent to explain a four-part test for evaluating the
propriety of injunctive relief: "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,

43.
44.

Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373.
Id. at 374.

45.

Id.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2964 (2008) (mer.).
See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 371, 382, 387.
Id. at 374-81.
Id. at 381.
See id. at 382.
Id. at 375.

52.

Id.
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(3) that the balance of equities
tips in his favor, and (4) that an injunction
53
is in the public interest."
Furthermore, the Court found that the lower courts had failed to reconsider the likelihood of harm to the moving party in light of the shutdown and power-down provisions alone.54 The Court acknowledged,
however, that these errors might ultimately have been harmless:
It is not clear that articulating the incorrect standard affected the
Ninth Circuit's analysis of irreparable harm. Although the court referred to the possibility standard, and cited Circuit precedent along
the same lines, it affirmed the District Court's conclusion
55 that plaintiffs had established a near certainty of irreparable harm.
Second, the Court briefly addressed the merits of the case: whether
the Navy's EA had satisfied its NEPA obligations, without filing an EIS.
The Court found that the Navy had met its procedural obligations under
NEPA for two reasons: because the Navy's activities had taken place for
forty years, and because the Navy had taken a "hard look at environmental consequences" before launching the SOCAL training exercises. 56
Third, the Court discussed the balance of equities. The Court emphasized that, because the case involved matters of national security, the
Court should grant "'great deference to the professional judgment of
military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular
military interest."'' 57 With this in mind, the Court accepted the Navy's
statement that the shutdown and power-down provisions would degrade
the value of the SOCAL training exercises.58
The Court found that the Navy's interest in realistic training exercises outweighed the public's ecological, scientific, and recreational interests in obtaining a preliminary injunction, and therefore the shutdown
and power-down provisions were an abuse of discretion. 59 The Court
found it important that NRDC sued to compel the Navy
to prepare an
6
EIS, not to enjoin the Navy from the use of MFA sonar. 0
Fourth, the Court addressed the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the
public interest element. Once again, the Court stressed the need for deference to the military's judgment regarding the impact of mitigation ef-

53. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 376.
55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)).
57. Id. at 377 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
58. See id.
59. Id. at 377-78.
60. Id. ("Given that the ultimate legal claim is that the Navy must prepare an EIS, not that it
must cease sonar training, there is no basis for enjoining such training in a manner credibly alleged
to pose a serious threat to national security.").
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forts on the efficacy of training exercises. 6' Specifically, the Court found
that the lower courts had not sufficiently deferred to the Navy's judg62
ment regarding the magnitude of the burden imposed by the injunction.
While the Ninth Circuit found that any unreasonable burden on the Navy
could later be alleviated by permitting the Navy to request relief on an
emergency basis, the Supreme Court disagreed, arguing that it would
compromise national security to award the Navy relief only once emergency circumstances have materialized.6 3
D. Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Stevens
joined in part. The concurring opinion found the shutdown and powerdown provisions to be an abuse of discretion for five reasons. First, Justice Breyer found that there was no proven need for the two challenged
provisions. 64 In other words, there was no strong evidence establishing
the amount65of marginal harm attributable to the two specific challenged
provisions.
Second, Justice Breyer deferred to Navy officials' assertions that a
delay in completing the SOCAL training exercises would have serious
ramifications for the Navy's combat readiness. 66 Third, the concurring
opinion found it important that the lower courts did not explain why they
rejected the Navy's affidavit-supported assessment of the two challenged
provisions' impact on the efficacy of the exercises. 67 Fourth, Justice
Breyer addressed the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the record, finding
fault with the Ninth Circuit's conclusions. 68 Fifth, Justice Breyer argued
that the district court imposed mitigation provisions that made69 continued
exercises impossible, defying the Ninth Circuit's instructions.
The concurrence concluded by suggesting that the Court should
have modified the injunction to include the altered shutdown and powerdown provisions that the Ninth Circuit imposed pending appeal.7v Justice
Breyer argued that the provisional measures had "become the status
quo," and that the measures were equitable in light of the Navy's ability
to conduct its training exercises under them.71

61.

See id. at 378-79.

62.

Id.

Id. at 380-8 1.
63.
64. Id. at 383 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 383-84.
65.
Id. at 384 ("Taken by themselves, [the Navy's] affidavits make a strong case for the
66.
proposition that insistence upon the two additional mitigating conditions would seriously interfere
with necessary defense training.").
67.
Id. at 384-85.
68.
Id. at 385-86.
69.
See id. at 386.
70.
Id. at 387.
71.

Id.

204
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E. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Souter
joined. The dissent argued that the lower courts did not abuse their discretion, because the balance of equities favored upholding the preliminary injunction against the Navy.72
First, Justice Ginsburg discussed the case and determined that the
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, in that an EIS was probably required before launching the SOCAL exercises.73 She argued that
the EIS is more than a mere procedural device; it forces government
agencies to fully consider the impact of their actions on the environment
before they act.74 As such, failure to prepare a timely EIS defeats

NEPA's purpose.75 She emphasized that, while NEPA does not require a
certain result, NEPA's EIS requirement
plays a crucial informational role
76
in the decision-making process.

Justice Ginsburg argued that the Navy could have avoided this suit
by simply preparing a sufficient, timely EIS. 77 The Navy sought favorable relief from the Executive Branch, rather than through the proper legislative channels. 78 Justice Ginsburg argued that this was "surely not
what Congress had in mind when it instructed agencies to comply with
NEPA 'to the fullest extent possible.' '' 79 Therefore, because the Navy
attempted to shortcut the process, equity demanded that the Navy bear
the burden of its procedural failures in the form of a preliminary injunction.8 °
Second, Justice Ginsburg stressed the importance of flexibility in
equitable relief.8' When the likelihood of harm is high, the likelihood that
the moving party will succeed on the merits is less important, and vice
versa. 82 The dissent argued that the majority opinion does not reject this
"sliding scale" standard.83 Justice Ginsburg found it significant that the
Navy itself predicted harm to marine mammals. 84 In light of this discussion, the dissent would have upheld the preliminary injunction in its enti85
rety.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 387 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 393.
See id. at 389-90.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 389-90.
See id. at 390.
Id.
Id. at 391 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006)).
See id. at 391-93.
Id. at 391 ("Flexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction.").
Id. at 392.

83.

id.

84.
85.

id.
Id. at 393.
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III. ANALYSIS

In Winter, the Court weighed in on a pre-existing conflict between
"the safety and continuation of the Republic and other values we hold
dear, among them a healthy environment. '' 86 The Court correctly pointed
out that the judiciary is inexperienced with national security issues, and
therefore the Court should defer to the military's judgment regarding
national security. 87 However, the Court's complete deference to the Navy
unfairly tipped the balance of equities and public policy interests in favor
of the Navy. More seriously, the Court's tacit approval of the Navy's
actions in circumventing NEPA could effectively invalidate NEPA as it
concerns the military. Finally, the Court's decision in Winter highlights a
broader trend: the military has used 9/11 and national security concerns
as a pretext for rolling back constraining environmental legislation.
A. The Court's Complete Deference to the Navy's FactualDeterminations
The Court deferred extensively to the Navy regarding several of the
Navy's key factual determinations. This deference, in aggregate, had the
effect of skewing the balance of equities and public policy interests in
favor of the Navy. The skewed balance of equities and public policy interests made it impossible for the Court to accurately evaluate the propriety of injunctive relief.
The Court's deference to the Navy in Winter involved the Navy's
factual determinations, rather than the Navy's interpretations
of its own
89
88
enabling act or regulations. Therefore, the Chevron and Skidmore
deference doctrines do not apply. Instead, the Court applied the military
deference standard set out in Goldman v. Weinberger.90 Professor Jona-

than Masur assails this type of deference as "judicial abdication," 9 1 and
contends that it is inconsistent with the body of law requiring some level
of judicial inquiry into agency determinations. 92 Professor Masur asserts
that such deference to the military has "overwhelmed the legal strictures
established to constrain the operation of executive power." 93 The Court's
86.
Hope Babcock, National Security and Environmental Laws: A Clear and Present Danger?, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 105,107 (2007).
87.
Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377.
88.
Chevron deference dictates that an agency's interpretation of its enabling act is binding on
courts, so long as the enabling act's language is ambiguous and the interpretation of that language is
reasonable. WILLIAM F. Fox, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 314-15 (5th ed. 2008) (discussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
89. Skidmore deference dictates that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is persuasive but not necessarily controlling. Id. at 320 (discussing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134
(1944)).
90. 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("[Clourts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest.").
91.
Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
441,515 (2005).
92.
Id. at 518-19.
93.
Id. at 445.
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complete deference to the military's factual determinations in Winter
permitted the Navy's version of the facts to determine the balance of
equities and public policy interests. The Court's opinion demonstrates
the effect of this deference in five different ways.
First, the Court deferred to the Navy's claim that no evidence connected the forty years of SOCAL exercises with a single sonar-related
injury to a marine mammal. 94 Yet, the Navy itself admitted that the exercises would affect approximately 80,000 marine mammals, some of
which would be severely injured or killed. 95 In fact, in 2000, the Navy
and NOAA Fisheries conducted an investigation into a mass marine
mammal stranding event in the Bahamas.9 6 The report concluded that the
seventeen marine mammals were driven onto shore by injuries from underwater acoustic sources. 97 The report connected those injuries to a series of contemporaneous Navy MFA sonar exercises, and the Navy
pledged to be more careful in the future.98
The evidence that the use of MFA sonar causes mass marine mammal strandings and deaths is "overwhelming," and the Navy was well
aware of it.99 It is surprising, then, that the Court deferred to the Navy's
assertion that there would be no irremediable damage to the environment. It is difficult to think of an injury less remediable than the death of
any number of marine mammals.
By contrast, the Navy's probable injuries in the case of a midtraining sonar shutdown are quite remediable. A mid-exercise MFA sonar shutdown would delay the completion of the exercise, and would
undoubtedly raise costs, but it would not make completion of the exercise impossible.'0° The Navy mischaracterized this inconvenience as an
irremediable injury, and the effect on marine mammals as negligible. The
majority accepted this mischaracterization at face value.
Second, the Court observed that the injunction's shutdown provision would amount to a hundredfold increase in the surface area of the
shutdown zone.1 'O However, at the Navy's urging, the Court disregarded
the observation that this MFA sonar shutdown zone is roughly the same
size as the Navy's existing long-frequency active ("LFA") sonar shutdown zone. 0 2 The Court, perhaps humbled by the Navy's chastisement
94.
95.
96.

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 381 (2008).
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 22, at 9.

NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. & DEP'T OF THE NAVY, JOINT INTERIM REPORT:
BAHAMAS MARINE MAMMAL STRANDING EVENT OF 15-16 MARCH 2000, at ii (2001),

www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/health/stranding-bahamas2000.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Id. at vi.
99. See Reynolds, supra note 25, at 762-69 (providing a catalog of other sonar-related stranding events).
100. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377; id. 384 (Breyer, J., concurring).
101.
Id. at 379.
102. See id. at 379-80.
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of the Ninth Circuit, declined to explore the effect on the training exercises of congruent MFA/LFA shutdown zones.10 3 By deferring to the
Navy's unsubstantiated claim that MFA sonar and LFA sonar are irreconcilably dissimilar in terms of the effect of the technology on marine
mammals, °4 the Court failed to consider a range of factors that could
have shown the burden to be smaller than the Navy asserted it to be.
Third, the Court deferred to the Navy regarding the power-down
provision. The Court correctly recognized the Navy's important interest
in training under surface ducting conditions when they exist. 0 5 Presumably, however, the conditions that conceal enemy submarines also conceal
marine mammals. In other words, when surface ducting conditions exist,
the Navy must be just as vigilant in avoiding marine mammals as it is in
looking for enemy submarines. As Justice Breyer argued, the Court could
have imposed the Ninth Circuit's provisional injunction, requiring the
Navy to power down the sonar in proportion to the proximity of marine
mammals to the vessel.' °6 Justice Breyer's compromise would allow the
Navy to continue training, while mitigating the injury to nearby marine
mammals.
Fourth, the Court deferred to the Navy regarding the connection between the SOCAL training exercises and national security. The Navy
asserted that the injunctions would jeopardize national security.107 This
conclusion was an exaggeration. The injunctions issued by the district
court would not make training exercises impossible; they would merely
cause delay and disruption. 0 8 Also, the injunctions applied to training
exercises in SOCAL waters, and not to Navy actions generally. 0 9
The Navy also argued the injunction would create "an unacceptable
risk to the Navy's ability to train for essential overseas operations at a
time when the United States is engaged in war in two countries."' 10 This
assertion was also an exaggeration. While the United States was indeed
at war in Iraq and in Afghanistan, none of the United States' adversaries
in those countries fielded a naval force-let alone the advanced "silent
submarines" that MFA sonar was designed to detect. The Navy failed to
explain the connection between adequate sonar training and combat readiness against these land-based, non-state forces. The Navy failed to explain how a delay in sonar training presented an "unacceptable risk" to
103.
scientific
judgment
53.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

"The Ninth Circuit's willingness to strike out on its own in this complicated military and
context underscores the degree to which it has failed to defer to the professional military
of the Nation's most senior naval officers .... " Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 22, at
Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 380.
Id.
concurring).
Id. at 387 (Breyer, J.,
Id. at 381 (majority opinion).
Id. at 384 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id. at 372-73 (majority opinion).
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 22, at 20.
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ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan."' The Navy also failed to explain
how the injunction affected the combat readiness of already-deployed2
forces, other than underlining the importance of fleet-wide integration."
Professor Burke refers to such unsubstantiated claims as "thoughtterminating clich[s]."' 13
Finally, the Court deferred to the Navy regarding the urgent need to
dissolve the injunction. The Court vacated the two challenged provisions,
effectively handing the Navy the same result that it had sought from the
CEQ.11 4 As Justice Ginsburg points out, however, the "emergency circumstances" under which the Navy obtained the alternative agreements
were of the Navy's own making: had the Navy filed an EIS before
launching the SOCAL training exercises, it would not have had to seek
emergency relief from the CEQ." 5 Justice Ginsburg correctly
argued that
1
the Navy should bear the burden of its procedural failures.' 6
The majority's eagerness to defer to the Navy's factual determinations regarding significant aspects of this case could also stem from the
suit's underlying subject matter. The NRDC sought not to permanently
enjoin the Navy from use of MFA sonar, but to compel the Navy to prepare an EIS, which at this stage of the case would have been merely a
procedural gesture." 7 Nevertheless, the Court's complete deference to
the Navy's factual determinations prevented the Court from accurately
evaluating the propriety of injunctive relief.
B. Winter's Impact on FutureMilitary Compliance with NEPA
The underlying issue in Winter was whether the Navy should have
prepared an EIS before launching its SOCAL training exercises. The
majority opinion focuses on the narrower issue: the propriety of two
challenged provisions in the district court's preliminary injunction. Although the Court generally avoided discussing the merits of the case,
during the injunctive relief discussion it did briefly discuss the likelihood
that NRDC would prevail on its NEPA claim. 1 8 The Court characterized
NEPA as a mere procedural device, and implied that the Navy's EA satisfied NEPA's EIS requirement. 19

111. See id. at 46 (stating that soldiers involved in the SOCAL training exercises conduct
missions within Iraq and Afghanistan).
112.
Id. at 4.
113.
Burke, supra note 3, at 808.
114.
Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 373-74.
115.
Id. at 390 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
116.
See id. at 387.
117.
See id. at 381 (majority opinion).
118.
Id. at 382.
119.
Id. at 376 ("NEPA imposes only procedural requirements to 'ensur[e] that the agency, in
reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts."' (alteration in original) (quoting Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989))).
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The assertion that NEPA is a procedural device is technically true in
that NEPA does not require any particular result, 120 but characterizing
NEPA as mere procedure ignores the crucial role that NEPA procedures
are designed to play in government agencies' decision-making processes.
As Justice Stevens noted in Robertson, NEPA's EIS requirement ensures
that government agencies will make informed decisions regarding
whether to undertake a proposed action. 121 In other words, the EIS is a
tool to be used before the action, to determine whether the action will
take place.
Justice Ginsburg agrees: "[T]he timing of an EIS is critical .... An

EIS must be prepared 'early enough so that it can serve practically as an
important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be
used to rationalize or justify decisions already made."",122 Justice Ginsburg characterized
the Navy's actions as "short circuit[ing]" its NEPA
123
obligations.
Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion argued that NEPA's ultimate objective is to ensure that agencies take a "hard look" at environmental consequences. 24 The Court argued that the Navy had conducted
its SOCAL training exercises for forty years without incident, and the
Navy's EA amounted to a hard look at the training exercise's environ25
mental
Therefore, the Court concluded, the Navy satisfied
thisconsequences.
objective. 126
The majority's reasoning is troubling. First, the Court's assertion
that the use of MFA sonar should not be enjoined because it has been in
use for forty years 27 is flawed. It would be bad public policy for a practice's history to establish its immunity from injunction. Otherwise, government agencies would have carte blanche to continue
28 any established
practice, regardless of harmful environmental impacts.
Second, the Court construes NEPA to require merely that agencies
take a hard look at environmental consequences.129 However, NEPA
unambiguously requires government agencies to prepare an EIS for all

120.

121.
122.
U.S. 347,
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.

Id. at 349.
Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 390 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442
351 n.3 (1979)).
Id. at 391.
Id. at 376 (majority opinion) (quoting Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350).
Id.
Id.
Id.

128.
The Court struck down another long-standing practice during the same term it decided
Winter: In Arizona v. Gant, a Fourth Amendment case involving police officers' right to search an
arrestee's vehicle, the court stated that, "[i]f it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals' interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement 'entitlement' to its persistence."
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009).
129.
Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376.
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major federal actions significantly affecting the human environment. 130
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens have both discussed the importance of
preparing an EIS, as opposed to merely taking a hard look. 13 1 Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens have concluded that NEPA's clear procedures,
132
including the EIS, are necessary to effectuate NEPA's purpose.
The Court's decision suggests that NEPA compliance is arbitrary,
so long as agencies take a hard look at the environmental consequences
of an activity. If adopted in a future decision, this "hard look" standard
would undermine NEPA by permitting agencies to provide post-hoc justification for environmentally destructive activities. Moreover, compared
to the clear EIS guidelines, 33 this hard look standard is vague. The standard threatens to waste judicial resources by delegating to courts the responsibility to determine, on a fact-intensive case-by-case basis, what
constitutes a hard look at an activity's environmental consequences. By
contrast, if an agency prepares an EIS, all a reviewing court must do is
apply NEPA's EIS requirements and implementing regulations.
Professor Hope Babcock highlights the fact that, while Congress
provided for military waiver procedures under many environmental statutes, it did not provide for a waiver procedure to NEPA's EIS requirement. 134 Despite this omission, NEPA allows the military some flexibility under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). The APA definition of "agency" excludes the exercise of military authority "in the field
in time of war," and only agencies as defined by the APA are required to
prepare an EIS. 135 Congress could have provided a waiver to the EIS
requirement, but it did not, possibly because the Navy was already exempt from preparing an EIS for wartime field operations. Congress did
not exempt the Navy from its obligation to prepare an EIS for domestic
training exercises, such as those in SOCAL.
Justice Ginsburg agrees that the EIS requirement is central to
NEPA's objectives. 136 She reasoned that the Navy's failure to file an EIS
instigated the action, and therefore that the Court should have upheld the
injunction. 37 This suggested holding is in perfect harmony with envi130. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
131.
See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 389-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348-53 (1989).
132. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 389 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.
133.
§ 4332(2)(C).
134. The Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, CERCLA, Safe
Drinking Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Endangered Species Act, Marine
Mammal Protection Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, and National Historic Preservation Act all
contain provisions which allow an executive official (usually the President) to waive the military's
obligation to comply with these acts in emergency circumstances. Babcock, supra note 86, at 11016.
135. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(l)(G) (2006); § 4332(2)(C).
136.
Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 389 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The EIS is NEPA's core requirement.").
137.
Id. at 387, 390, 393.
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ronmental compliance considerations; if the Court showed an inclination
to impose preliminary injunctive relief when an agency fails to file an
EIS, agencies would be more likely to comply with NEPA. Unfortunately, the Court's decision in Winter may prove to discourage agencies from
filing NEPA-compliant environmental impact statements.
C. The Military's Post-9/1 1 Offensive Against EnvironmentalLegislation
Finally, the Winter Court's willingness to defer to the Navy's judgment and to allow the Navy to bypass clear NEPA requirements is part of
a broader, more troubling trend. Professor Babcock accuses the Department of Defense ("DOD") of manipulating post-9/1 1 national security
concerns to stage an offensive against constraining environmental legislation. 138
Professor Babcock explains this trend in light of the broader post1 39
9/11 erosion of civil liberties exemplified by the USA PATRIOT Act.
The USA PATRIOT Act, enacted in the months immediately following
9/11, was intended to enhance the government's power to combat terrorist threats, but had the additional effect of eroding civil liberties. 40 Until
recently, the military had to resort to various statutory waiver systems to
circumvent environmental legislation. 14 ' But military efforts to curtail
environmental legislation found
new traction in the post-9/1 1 and post142
USA PATRIOT Act reality.
For example, in the years immediately following the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, the DOD convinced Congress to exempt the military from key
areas of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"), the Marine Mammal
43
Protection Act ("MMPA"), and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").1
These exemptions were characterized as essential to national security. 144
This trend shows no sign of slowing. 45 In fact, the Navy urged the Court
in Winters to view the Navy's MMPA exemption as evidence that other
environmental regimes should necessarily be subordinated to military

138.
"[Tjhe military is using the 'war on terrorism' as a Trojan horse to get out from under
thirty years of constraining environmental laws it has never fully accepted." Babcock, supra note 86,
at 110. "[T]he 9/11 attacks provided DOD with an opportunity that it seized to get relief from laws
that it has resisted for decades." Id. at 153.
139. See id. at 120-26.
140.
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
141.
Babcock, supra note 86, at 110- 16 (describing the waiver processes available to the military under various environmental statutes).
142.
Burke, supra note 3, at 811.
143.
See id. at 808; Babcock, supra note 86, at 127-30.
144.
U.S. Representative Bob Barr, R-GA, advocated for the continued abrogation of environmental legislation, characterizing the debate as a false choice between soldiers "surviv[ing] on the
battlefield" and "trampling blades of grass." Burke, supra note 3, at 807.
145.
Professor Babcock notes that the military has also set its sights on securing exemptions
from the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). Babcock, supra note 86, at 132.
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training."46 Then-Vice President Dick Cheney referred to the post-9/11
restrictions on civil liberties as "the new normalcy." 147 These assertions
suggest an intent to roll back all constraining environmental legislation,
not just MMPA or NEPA, which should have given the Court pause.
With Winter, this troubling trend has spread to NEPA. The Court
accepted the Navy's tenuous assertion that the SOCAL training exercises
are necessary to ensure military preparedness. 48 Such deference to the
Navy's factual determinations, and willingness to create military exemptions to existing environmental regimes, allows the military to dodge its
environmental obligations.
CONCLUSION

While deference to the military's professional judgment is to a certain extent desirable, it is possible for courts to defer to an unreasonable
extent. When a court unquestioningly accepts one party's characterization of a case, the court simply cannot accurately evaluate the propriety
of injunctive relief. In Winter, the Court's complete deference to the
Navy's factual determinations unfairly tipped the balance of equities and
public policy interests against the plaintiffs.
The Court's complete deference to the Navy will likely have an impact far beyond the parties involved. First, the Court's decision implies
that the military can comply with NEPA's objectives without having to
comply with NEPA procedures. Second, the Court's decision perpetuates
the military's offensive against "constraining" environmental legislation. 149 In Winter, the Court missed out on an opportunity to slow this
trend, and prevent the military's rollback of environmental legislation.
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